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Abstract
The technological vision of smart urbanism has been promoted as a silver bullet for urban prob-
lems and a major market opportunity. The search is on for firms and governments to find effec-
tive and transferable demonstrations of advanced urban technology. This paper examines
initiatives by the UK national government to facilitate urban technological innovation through a
range of strategies, particularly the TSB Future Cities Demonstrator Competition. This case
study is used to explore opportunities and tensions in the practical realisation of the smart city
imaginary. Tensions are shown to be partly about the conjectural nature of the smart city debate.
Attention is also drawn to weakened capacity of urban governments to control their infrastruc-
tural destiny and also constraints on the ability of the public and private sectors to innovate. The
paper contributes to smart city debates by providing further evidence of the difficulties in sub-
stantiating the smart city imaginary.
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Introduction
In 2012, the UK government’s national
innovation agency, the Technology Strategy
Board (TSB), launched a competition to sti-
mulate technological innovation in UK
urban management. The Future Cities
Demonstrator Competition (FCDC) gave 30
municipal authorities £50,000 each to
develop feasibility studies, with a further
£24m available for implementation of the
winning idea (TSB, 2012a). This competition
can be seen as part of the quest to unlock
the promise of a technologically enhanced
‘smart city’, and for UK government this
brought benefits at ‘home’ (urban service
delivery improvements) and ‘abroad’
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(competitive advantage in smart city goods
and services). In this paper, we use insights
from the FCDC to advance debate about
the drivers, challenges and opportunities of
cutting edge urban innovation.
There is a growing literature on the ten-
sions underpinning ‘techno-utopian’
(Luque et al., 2014) visions of smart urban-
ism. Our particular focus in this paper is
the challenge for policy-makers of moving
from the attractive but elusive imaginaries
of smart city discourse to tangible interven-
tion. The starting point is that there are sig-
nificant state interests in exploiting smart
city technology, whether to enhance citizen
engagement and local democracy, improve
local service delivery efficiency, build infra-
structural resilience, or increase the possibi-
lities for remote surveillance and control.
However, evidence points to important
challenges in realising this potential, includ-
ing: having to work through technology
providers with different priorities; potential
knowledge deficits about what is possible
and how it might be steered; and limited
resources to fund the required infrastruc-
ture. These are issues about the capacity to
intervene and the quality of knowledge and
knowing within the state.
It is this context that frames our interest
in the FCDC. The FCDC was part of a
wider set of initiatives to develop national
innovation policy around the smart city
agenda. This reflects a move to supplement
the TSB’s focus on relatively well-defined
science and technology innovation sectors
(e.g. ICT (Information & Communication
Technologies), construction, pharmaceuti-
cals, energy) with a more cross-cutting
theme on cities and ‘urban’ intervention.
The FCDC’s aim was not so much to fund
experiments (cf. Evans, 2011; Schmeink,
2013), as to stimulate creative thinking both
within local government and between local
governments and relevant private-sector
partners about potential smart city interven-
tion and especially smart city product
development.
As we demonstrate, the FCDC is there-
fore of wider interest to urban and regional
scholars for a number of reasons. First, it
highlights some of the practical and concep-
tual challenges of translating smart urbanism
into a tangible object of governance. Here
issues are raised about the disconnections
between ‘home’ and ‘overseas’ intervention
and the tensions between collaboration and
competition amongst different public and
private interests. Second, the FCDC pro-
vides a distinctive view on the issues at stake
for governments in positioning cities as
laboratories for wider public or commercial
projects. What we describe empirically is the
process of trying to ‘fill-in’ the concept of
urban technological innovation known as
the smart city.
The empirical work is based on interviews
with local authorities and consultants
involved in the FCDC. The paper draws out
a series of conflicts in mobilising public and
private interests around urban technological
innovation, some of which reflect the curious
ways in which cities were positioned, but also
the broader difficulties in grasping the smart
city as systemic transformation. We begin by
examining the potential difficulties for gov-
ernments in facilitating smart city experi-
mentation within the context of prevailing
norms of urban governance. The paper then
examines the context, process and outcomes
of the FCDC case study in relation to the
meaning of smart urbanism and the capaci-
ties and capabilities it requires of public and
private interests. The conclusions look
beyond the specific circumstances of the
Future Cities Demonstrator Competition to
consider the broader implications for
research on the rolling out of smart city
innovation.
2 Urban Studies
 at Royal Hallamshire on January 26, 2016usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Competing interests, empty
discourse and the struggle to ‘fill-
in’ the smart city
The quest for technologically enhanced
urban management – often termed the
‘smart city’ or ‘smart urbanism’ – is generat-
ing significant attention amongst govern-
ments, technology providers and academia.
The term ‘smart’ has frequently been used
interchangeably with ‘wired’, ‘digital’, ‘tele-
communications’, ‘informational’ and ‘intel-
ligent’ (Hollands, 2008). Dirks and Keeling
(2009) define a smart city as one that deploys
technology to transform core systems (peo-
ple, business, transport, communication,
water and energy) and optimise returns from
finite resources. In the context of climate
change, democratic deficits and rising urban
welfare costs, smart city restructuring has
emerged as a significant source of hope for
urban futures. It promises a new era of opti-
mised ‘smart’ infrastructural management
that connects the supplies and demands of
people, organisations and objects in new and
exciting ways. The smart city formulation is
integral to enhancing economic competitive-
ness, quality of life and a dynamic image – a
key urban imaginary for the emergent 21st
century city (Luque et al., 2014).
Although the smart city ‘can mean differ-
ent things to different cities’ (Hollands,
2008: 310), the concept is underpinned by
the promise of addressing meta-issues of cli-
mate change, urbanisation, citizen engage-
ment and resource efficiency. As Viitanen
and Kingston (2013: 1) suggest, ‘the smart
city can be understood as an urban strategy
that seeks advanced technological solutions
to the pressing issues facing policy makers’.
Or, as Gabrys puts it (2014: 31), smart city
proposals ‘have focused on how networked
mechanisms and participatory media might
achieve ‘‘greener’’ or more efficient cities
that are simultaneously engines for growth’.
The smart city is a ‘technical solution to
political and environmental issues’ (Gabrys,
2014: 44), a potential ‘technological fix’
(Viitanen and Kingston, 2013).
Particular emphasis is placed on the role
of ICT – wireless broadband, analytical soft-
ware, real-time sensing and feedback, and
the ‘Internet of Things’ (Srivastava and
Vakali, 2012) in enabling urban innovation
through citizen interaction and greater con-
nectivity between services (Hooper, 2010).
Washburn et al. (2010) define a smart city as
one which uses ‘real-time awareness [.] and
advanced analytics to help people make
more intelligent decisions’; the aim is ‘to
deploy ubiquitous computing across urban
infrastructures and mobile devices’ (Gabrys,
2014: 30). As Gabrys (2014: 31) emphasises,
‘cities infused by digital technologies and
imaginaries are not a new development’, but
it is the intersection of ‘smart’ and ‘sustain-
able’ urbanisms that underpins the enthusi-
asm for smart cities. The smart city quest is
being driven by the overlapping interests of
academia, government and industry. It is
being worked through multi-scaled and
multi-sectoral experimentation, innovation
and searching, often focusing significant
R&D efforts in ‘urban laboratory’ trials.
However, the smart city concept has
attracted growing scepticism. It is argued,
for example, that smart city technologies
may encourage increased surveillance, tech-
nical lock-ins, the outsourcing of power and
control to private-sector providers, and rein-
forced marginalisation of excluded citizens
(Hollands, 2008; Vanolo, 2013). As Viitanen
and Kingston (2013: 13) argue, ‘the smart
city political economy constructed around
‘‘green growth’’ provides powerful levers of
control for the technology elites that regula-
tors appear ill prepared to reign in’. There is
also disquiet about the power and invest-
ment choices of technology providers and
disregard for the ‘unknown or hidden
Taylor Buck and While 3
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consequences’ (Viitanen and Kingston,
2013: 1) of the smart city. Concerns persist
that the smart city is little more than a mar-
keting label (Hollands, 2008) or a hollow
urban imaginary in search of meaning.
Many commentators simply question the
substance of the technological vision and the
capacity to deliver significant change within
the materially and institutionally messy real-
ity of cities.
In this context, Luque et al. (2014) high-
light that smart urbanism was preceded by
earlier attempts to promote ‘so-called trans-
formative urban technology’, where the
promised benefits were not realised or only
realised after extended trial and error experi-
mentation (cf. Graham and Marvin, 1996,
2001). The problem is partly that technologi-
cal benefits tend to be overstated, but even
where the technology has potential, innova-
tion is compromised by the ‘messy practice
of their selective application’, in particular
social and political contexts (Luque et al.,
2014: 75). The interests of those promoting
smart urbanism do not necessarily overlap
neatly given the mix of private (provider)
and public (consumer) interests.
Whilst critiques of the smart city as dis-
course are well-founded, there is a danger
that they overlook the necessarily experi-
mental and emergent nature of smart city
restructuring. Indeed, cities have and con-
tinue to be reworked around ICTs in myriad
ways, both through the infrastructural hard-
ware of the city and the integration of ICTs
into the daily lives of firms and citizens. One
issue is that the smart city discourse (includ-
ing its critiques) is often rooted in the expec-
tation of transformational systemic change
that overlooks the roll out of the smart city
through multiple incremental and smaller
scale changes. Indeed, evidence suggests that
smart city innovation is most evident
through well-funded niche experiments in a
limited range of urban contexts (Evans and
Karvonen, 2014; Vanolo, 2013).
Tensions in the rolling out and filling-in of
smart city imaginaries
One dimension of smart cities requiring fur-
ther work is therefore the practical realisa-
tion of innovation and its contribution to
urban restructuring: What are the geogra-
phies of smart city innovation? What inno-
vation is happening and where? Addressing
these questions focuses attention on defini-
tions of innovation and also potential ten-
sions between the normative goals of smart
city innovation and the context in which
urban innovation unfolds. It is understand-
able that national and local governments
might be interested in stimulating potentially
transformative smart city investment.
Benefits include increased infrastructure and
services efficiency, enhanced citizen engage-
ment via tailored service provision and
democracy, and improved image and eco-
nomic development, with ‘smart’ joining
‘sustainability’ as a key trope in the promo-
tion of a dynamic modern city (Chin et al.,
2010; Hollands, 2008). As we show below,
some national governments will also have
interests in exploiting potential competitive
advantages in smart city technology as part
of national innovation and export strategies.
The quest for smart city restructuring reso-
nates with the broader competitive urban
politics of infrastructural renewal (Hodson
and Marvin, 2010). This is a matter of inter-
twined social and economic securitisation of
local territory. As Hodson and Marvin
(2010) demonstrate, concerns about energy
and ecological security have encouraged cit-
ies such as London, New York and San
Francisco to promote low-carbon transitions
as a means of reinforcing their competitive
economic advantages, recasting neoliberal
inter-urban competition as an ‘eco-competi-
tive race’ (Hodson and Marvin, 2010: 98).
The rationale behind this, they argue, is to
protect cities against the vulnerabilities of
resource scarcity and climate change, but
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also to ‘remain competitive, predicated in
the first instance on the ideological pursuit
of mobile capital rather than specific local
priorities’ (Hodson and Marvin, 2010: 9).
Smart city technologies are deeply impli-
cated in any attempts to secure infrastruc-
tural resilience.
Yet as with other aspects of urban infra-
structure, state orchestrators are faced with
significant challenges in translating aspira-
tion into reality. In principle, the interest of
governments in supporting smart city inno-
vation should overlap with the burgeoning
supply-side of smart city innovations. Smart
city literature has a keen interest in the role
of technology and service providers in creat-
ing markets for smart city products and
determining pathways for smart city transi-
tion (Batty et al., 2012; Chin et al., 2010). As
the private sector is assumed to be at ICTs’
cutting edge, it has an unrivalled position in
influencing urban experiments (Viitanen and
Kingston, 2013), which are often enacted
globally via futuristic ‘city labs’. This is cer-
tainly demonstrated by initiatives such as
Arup’s Cities & Climate Change programme
(Arup, 2014), Microsoft’s CityNext
(Microsoft, 2014) or IBM’s global ‘Smarter
Cities Challenge’ (IBM, 2010).
However, smart technology supply and
demand does not necessarily translate
unproblematically into improved urban
management. A number of potential ten-
sions can be identified. First, the smart city
vision relies partly on connections across dif-
ferent spheres of urban management and ser-
vice provision. This coalescence sits uneasily
with the tendency for urban infrastructural
and service management to become ever
more splintered because of the neoliberal dis-
aggregation, outsourcing and privatisation
of urban service provision (Graham and
Marvin, 2001; McFarlane and Rutherford,
2008). In many contexts, smart city innova-
tion has to contend with complex organisa-
tional and investment arrangements and
ownership patterns. Indeed, smart city stra-
tegies are often an attempt to establish an
integrated perspective as the first stage in
overcoming fragmented and splintered ser-
vice provision (Luque et al., 2014).
Second, there are potential asymmetries
in the interests on the supply-and-demand
side of smart city technologies. Smart city
innovators often seek profits, meaning that
some places are priced out of the market or
do not have the profile to attract investment
by acting as ‘halo models’. As highlighted
by Hodson and Marvin (2010), it is to be
expected that the most innovative private-
sector firms to gravitate towards wealthier
places with the public or private resources to
pay for enhanced urban services. Arguably,
this is currently demonstrated in the UK by
the repeated focus on London as the innova-
tion hub, with many other cities left behind
(Aziz et al., 2011; HM Treasury, 2006).
Moreover, whilst the private sector aims to
produce universal solutions that can be
applied globally with minimal adaptation to
maximise profit, cities require co-produced
and place-specific smart city solutions. For
example, smart city theory might suggest
that an innovation is trialed in one city and
then rolled out more generally. However,
the ‘open sourcing’ of innovation can con-
flict with commercial/competitive interests,
such as the time and intermediaries required
to develop a thorough understanding of
place and its specific requirements (Viitanen
and Kingston, 2013). The potential tensions
between system control and open sourcing is
demonstrated in literature on urban labora-
tories (Evans and Karvonen, 2014). Urban
laboratories are at the forefront of city
reconfiguration (Karvonen and van Heur,
2014), facilitating experimentation around
design, implementation, measurement and
up-scaling. Indeed, it is the supposed place-
lessness of laboratories that lends a universal
quality to the knowledge gained (Karvonen
and van Heur, 2014). However, through
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property ownership and political influence,
powerful urban actors can exert enormous
pressure on city projects that belies the
impression of clinical scientific detachment
given by the term ‘laboratory’.
Third, alongside potential conflicts
between supply and demand actors, effective
smart city initiatives require leadership, sta-
keholder buy-in, and ownership or coordi-
nation of key platforms. Nam and Pardo
(2011) stress the importance of cross-
organisational and cross-system interoper-
ability as well as strong leadership with a
commitment to change. However, a wide
range of literature has highlighted the tech-
nical and financial knowledge, skills and
expertise required of the public sector in
enabling urban infrastructural and technolo-
gical transitions (Monstadt, 2007). As
Monstadt (2007: 336) demonstrates, ‘the
delegation of public tasks to the private sec-
tor is partially misunderstood as a discharge
of public duties’, and the enabling of
private-sector intervention requires new reg-
ulatory tasks for professional contractual
management, performance evaluation and
supervision by public authorities. There are
questions about whether governments have
sufficient knowledge, expertise and resources
to engage in negotiations with smart city
providers. Local government’s capacity to
commission effectively and the extent to
which there is platform integration have
been weakened by the privatisation, out-
sourcing and state fiscal retrenchment
(Monstadt, 2007, 2009). National and local
governments often lack sufficient expertise
to effectively bid, let and negotiate contracts,
and the legal means to enforce these con-
tracts (Brown and Potoski, 2003).
There are therefore likely to be significant
capacity constraints for cities in developing
and implementing meaningful interventions
in the context of an emerging and challen-
ging market for smart city goods and ser-
vices (Hodson and Marvin, 2010). The city is
not necessarily a supine patient waiting to be
experimented on and rewired, but brings its
own material challenges in terms of institu-
tional and infrastructural lock-ins and social,
economic and environmental pressures and
demands. In the following sections, these
issues about the capacity and capability of
cities to engage in smart city restructuring
are examined through the lens of the Future
Cities Demonstrator Competition. The
empirical analysis draws on a mixture of pri-
mary and secondary data, including semi-
structured interviews with representatives of
nine of the bidders: Bristol, Cambridge,
Coventry, Greater London Authority
(GLA), Glasgow, Manchester, Sheffield,
Stoke-on-Trent and Swindon, regarding the
preparation of FCDC feasibility studies
(referred to here as ‘bids’). We also review
secondary data from all 29 of the bids pub-
licly available on the TSB website and
related reports including an evaluation of
proposals by Arup consulting (Arup, 2013).
Imaginary meets reality: The TSB
Future Cities Demonstrator
Competition
Established in 2004 as a national govern-
ment advisory board, in 2007 the TSB
became an ‘arms length’ publicly funded
agency of UK central government. Its remit
is to accelerate national economic growth by
helping UK firms and researchers respond
to global market opportunities (Dickins
et al., 2013), with a view that ‘the countries
most likely to benefit from these opportuni-
ties will be those which can innovate most
rapidly’ (TSB, 2014a). It invests ‘in commer-
cialising new ideas with business. targeting
technologies and areas with the greatest
scope to improve business, the economy and
society’ (TSB, 2013a). The TSB’s role is
therefore twofold: to identify innovation
opportunities and to tackle barriers to realis-
ing those opportunities by working across
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business, academia and government. To
reflect this remit, in 2014 the TSB was re-
branded as ‘Innovate UK’, though it is
referred to as the TSB throughout this
paper. The TSB uses a range of mechanisms
to stimulate innovation, including: a net-
work of field-specific innovation centres;
collaborative R&D for new products, pro-
cesses and services; demonstrators that
enable testing and validation of innovation
to accelerate market readiness; engagement
events that foster business collaboration
(TSB, 2013b); and, in line with the UK’s
market-led governance model, competitions.
The TSB’s strong emphasis on ‘encouraging
challenge-led innovation’ (TSB, 2013c: 6)
means it has developed a modus operandi of
inviting competitive bids from business and
academics in response to calls for proposals.
During 2012–2013, the TSB ‘ran more than
70 thematic competitions for R&D and
innovation funding’ (TSB, 2013b: 29). These
competitions vary in scale and scope, may
be single or multi-sector, and can involve the
development of practical place-specific
demonstrator projects. The competition calls
fall under specific identified priority areas
which the TSB defines by determining mar-
ket need and perception of globally signifi-
cant problems. The ethos is that government
action to address these issues can pro-
foundly change the focus or speed of market
development. Close collaboration with UK
government departments to understand their
intentions and actions allows the TSB to
assist relevant communities to address evol-
ving market needs (TSB, 2013c) and pro-
mote sustainable UK business growth. The
TSB’s total budget for 2013–2014 was
approximately £440m (TSB, 2012b).
The TSB’s strategy for 2011–2015 focused
on five societal challenge areas: energy,
healthcare, built environment, food and
transport; underpinned by two general com-
petencies – high value manufacturing and
digital services (TSB, 2013c). The urban
remit was clearly implicated within energy,
built environment and transport, but there
was no overarching cities theme. From 2012
onwards, however, Future Cities was a pri-
ority theme, with plans for a Future Cities
Catapult to stimulate innovation (TSB,
2013c). The TSB’s move into cities is perhaps
a logical extension of its national innovation
systems remit, given the UK’s international
urban consultancy strengths and emerging
smart city market opportunities. The UK,
and London in particular, has long been the
base for international built environment/cit-
ies consultancy firms, and the UK has a
large research community working on these
issues. Moreover, the TSB identified cities as
a significant international market opportu-
nity for the UK: ‘the accessible market for
integrated city systems is estimated to be
£200bn a year by 2030’ (TSB, 2014b). The
influence of international exemplars on this
shifting focus is not explicit within TSB doc-
umentation, but its implementation was con-
temporaneous with various initiatives such
as ‘Amsterdam Smart City’ (Amsterdam
Smart City, 2014), ‘Yokohama Smart City
Project’ (City of Yokohama, 2014) and
‘Model City Mannheim Project’ (MOMA)
(Siemens, 2012).
The TSB’s cities work was preceded by
two initiatives. Its Low Impact Buildings
Innovation Platform, set up in 2008, recog-
nised the need to expand the focus from indi-
vidual buildings to groups of buildings and
ultimately cities (TSB, 2012b). Is also estab-
lished an ‘Internet of Things’ Knowledge
Transfer Network in January 2011 (TSB,
2011a), which originally stated that ‘a wide-
spread Internet of Things has the potential
to transform how we live in our cities’
(Young, 2011). Later the same year, the TSB
recruited a project manager for the nascent
‘Future Cities Catapult’ (TSB, 2011b).
However, the ‘built environment’ theme
was more closely tied to building technolo-
gies and therefore more easily defined than
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the rather amorphous topic of ‘cities’. In
some respects, ‘urbanisation’ raises signifi-
cant challenges for the TSB in terms of car-
ving out a distinctive ‘urban’ niche vis-a`-vis
other priority areas. It was recognised that
considerable development was required to
stimulate and support product development
in the context of (a) the UK consultancy sec-
tor having few discrete urban products to
export; (b) the lack of a coherent urban con-
sulting firm innovation system, causing ten-
sions between collaboration and
competition; (c) the emergent nature of the
smart city; and (d) city problems rarely
being solely technological challenges and
often centering on ‘soft’ human infrastruc-
tures of trust, reciprocity and attachment
(Interviews; Gibbs et al., 2013; Paquet,
2001). It could be argued therefore that the
multi-sectoral and often societally rooted
challenges of urban environments are a poor
fit for an economic development body such
as the TSB:
[The TSB] approach cities very much from a
business perspective . what industry can do
for cities. I don’t necessarily agree that that’s
the right approach. (Interview #7)
There were also concerns about whether UK
cities could provide appropriate environ-
ments for internationally transferable urban
innovation laboratories. Therefore, while
there is a rationale for urban innovation sup-
port through bodies such as the TSB, the
question is how did the TSB seek to fill-in
the smart city imaginary?
One central issue was the need to demon-
strate practical application. As outlined
above, the potential economic, social and
governance benefits of urban innovation
have stimulated a significant wave of city
experiments, mainly initiated by national
governments seeking to promote innovation
or private-sector companies seeking to
demonstrate their goods and services (Batty
et al., 2012; Evans and Karvonen, 2014;
Gabrys, 2014; Karvonen and van Heur,
2014). However, public- and private-sector
interests do not necessarily overlap neatly in
these urban experiments, nor do economic,
social and environmental goals (Viitanen
and Kingston, 2013).
In 2012, the TSB decided to fund local
authorities to develop innovative ‘Future
Cities’ bids. The FCDC challenge was for
UK cities to demonstrate city system inte-
gration to create better places to live and
work whilst increasing resilience. The inten-
tion was to ‘demonstrate at scale, and in use,
the additional value . created by integrat-
ing city systems, [enabling] businesses to test
. new solutions. [and allowing] UK cities
to explore new approaches to delivering a
good local economy and excellent quality of
life, whilst reducing the environmental foot-
print and increasing resilience to environ-
mental change’ (TSB, 2012a: 2).
The competition was a two-stage process.
First, urban areas with a minimum popula-
tion of 125,000 were invited to bid for
£50,000 to carry out a feasibility study for
‘Future City’ Integration. Second, on com-
pleting the feasibility study, entrants could
submit a proposal for the £24m large-scale
demonstrator funding. Stage 1 opened on
June 2012, with three weeks for Stage 1
applications, and if successful, a further 19
weeks for feasibility study reports and full
applications. Of the 50 municipalities that
applied for Stage 1 funding, 30 were
awarded feasibility study grants. These 30
cities represented a broad geographical and
population range, although the vast majority
were in England, with two in Scotland, one
in Wales and one in Northern Ireland. Key
selection criteria included: the ability to host
a large-scale demonstrator, population size;
potential service delivery innovation; and
crucially, evidence of existing or current
investment in city systems (TSB, 2012a). At
Stage 2, of the 29 cities that completed bids,
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26 submitted full demonstrator proposals.
The following two subsections look in more
detail at the process and outcomes of the
FCDC in terms of two principle challenges
in the rolling out of smart urbanism: (a) the
definition of smart urbanism; and (b) the
capacity to move from techno-utopian
vision to tangible reality.
Prospecting for the smart city: Definitions
and outcomes
The FCDC’s explicit requirement for tangi-
ble intervention provides a rare opportunity
to examine the practical realisation of the
normative imaginary of smart urban innova-
tion. The question of whether this was possi-
ble, and over what timescales, was
something of a fault line in the framing of
the competition, reflecting tensions in
national innovation policy between open-
ended experimentation and shorter-term
product development. For example, the TSB
states that that ‘future cities’ must ‘deliver
economic activity, quality of life and a lower
environmental footprint’ (TSB, 2012b: 29)
with ‘the citizen at the heart of the city’
(TSB, 2014b). Yet reflecting the TSB’s remit,
the FCDC focus was strongly technologi-
cally biased, with twin goals of supporting
transferable product development and bene-
fiting city management in particular places.
Whilst these goals are not mutually exclu-
sive, they might lead to differing responses.
Participants reported a degree of confusion
about the underlying intentions:
I think TSB have confused the language a lot
here. my take. is that the smart bit enables
you to create a future city, and the smart bit is
essentially technology. (Interview #7)
there was confusion over the requirements .
how scale related . what the criteria were.
(Interview #2)
Despite the confusion regarding the FCDC’s
overarching goals, city bids showed marked
similarities in the challenges identified, cut-
ting across socio-economic, political and
environmental issues. There was an over-
whelming focus on improving energy use,
environmental footprint, quality of life,
transport and local economic opportunity
(Table 1). Education, buildings, water and
safety were much less common, while despite
the apparent importance of the citizen, only
a very small proportion of bids considered
either housing or community. Notably some
core dimensions of the smart city imaginary
– such as the emphasis on green growth or
community benefits – received less emphasis
in the bids. It is perhaps not surprising, given
the TSB’s mission and government emphasis
on economic growth, that almost all bids
emphasised local economic development
benefits, but this also reflects the limited
capacity and influence of UK local govern-
ment to engage more creatively across urban
service provision.
In terms of the key FCDC requirement of
integrating city systems, eight bids involved
the integration of just two systems, generally
a mix of energy, transport, and health &
social care (Table 2). For example, integra-
tion of transport with health & social care
was central to Birmingham’s bid, based on
Table 1. Key strategic themes in FCDC bid
documents (after Arup, 2013).
Theme No. of bids
Local Economy 26
Transport 25
Health & Social care 21
Environment 21
Energy 20
Education 12
Buildings 10
Water 7
Safety & Security 7
Waste 7
Community 2
Housing 2
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the calculation that NHS transport repre-
sents 30% of city traffic (Birmingham City
Council, 2012: 26). A further five bids sought
to create two ‘parallel’ integrations, each
involving two systems. For example, Ipswich
proposed integrations of: ‘transport & health
& social care’ and ‘local economy & educa-
tion’, but there were no interconnections
between these parallel themes. Ten other
bids proposed more ‘multipoint’ integrations
that encompassed three or more systems.
For example, Milton Keynes proposed inte-
grating energy systems with waste and local
economy, which was in turn integrated with
education. None of the bids proposed what
might be considered ‘holistic’ multipoint
integration that involved more than four city
systems.
Perhaps the ultimate test of the FCDC is
whether it was able to facilitate distinctive
technological or advances in relation to
smart urbanism. Some of the more notable
project ideas included Manchester’s pro-
posal for a ‘super trench’, combining heat-
network piping, DC cabling and a ‘last mile’
rail trolley freight and waste system. Last-
mile transport solutions attempt to tackle
the issue that the last mile of a supply chain
is often the least efficient, owing to the fact
that freight must move from high capacity
efficient modes of transport (e.g. trains) to
lower capacity, less efficient modes of
transport (e.g. vans or lorries). Similarly,
London’s ‘last-mile’ freight system proposed
using electric vans to exploit alternative
energy sources and storage, as well as feed-
ing new district heating networks with waste
heat extracted from the London
Underground system, electrical substations
and data centres. Glasgow proposed Smart
Building Management System (BMS) and
an Intelligent Operations Platform, allowing
real-time information feeds to building man-
agers regarding actual versus optimal build-
ing performance for that particular building
design, energy conservation measures and
deep retrofit options. The ‘last-mile’ freight
system of these proposals is a much dis-
cussed concept within the future cities litera-
ture (e.g. Edwards et al., 2010). Similarly,
the underground heat recovery project had
already been piloted in Paris (Reuters,
2010), and real-time advanced BMS propos-
als are not uncommon in discussions about
smart cities (Moreno et al., 2014). The ques-
tion is whether it was innovative application
or innovation technology development that
mattered for the competitive urbanism of
the FCDC. Bristol’s proposed Community
Communications Canopy is a network based
on radio frequency-enabled photocells retro-
fitted to the existing street lighting system to
facilitate access to broadband and introduce
a network to transmit information collected
by sensors. Bristol’s bid also presented a
detailed analysis of city systems (e.g. water,
mobility, energy, community, waste, etc.)
and their interactions, and planned to com-
bine technical innovation with an overhaul
of governance structures. The focus on gov-
ernance was to ensure that: the Bristol City
Operating Platform would be used in ways
that benefited the city; data security con-
cerns were allayed; the correct skills and
expertise were involved in steering the pro-
gramme; and that culture change within the
public sector was effectively supported
(Bristol City Council, 2012). This approach
Table 2. City system integration themes in FCDC
bids.
Theme No. of bids
Energy + Transport 12
Energy + Local economy 10
Transport + Health & Social care 10
Local economy + Education 8
Energy + Buildings 6
Energy + Waste 6
Transport + Environment 4
Health & Social care + Education 3
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included an ethics committee to ensure that
citizens’ interests remained central to the
way information is gathered and shared,
with the aim of building trust around issues
of data privacy. Crucially, given the con-
strained timescales for the competition, the
most developed submissions were based on
ideas previously proposed or already under
development.
The capacity for smart city innovation
The FCDC decision to work through local
government might seem surprising and
somewhat curious given the relatively limited
powers and resources and diminished capa-
cities of UK local government in key areas
of infrastructure and service provision. The
difficulties facing UK cities in assembling
the resources and governance powers to
reshape urban hardware is well documented,
and reflects the limited autonomy of munici-
pal government and the effects of successive
rounds of neoliberal hollowing out of the
local state (Bulkeley and Kern, 2006;
Graham and Marvin, 2001). The exception
is Greater London,1 which has greater pow-
ers and autonomy than other UK municipal
authorities, especially in areas such as trans-
port (Hodson and Marvin, 2012). One key
issue for UK cities, including London, is that
infrastructure regimes are not organised at
an urban or city-regional scale. Although
water management and energy generation
and supply originated as a local government
function, decisions were regionalised and
centralised as part of 20th-century welfare
state policies (Bulkeley and Kern, 2006).
Compared with many other countries, UK
multilevel government is strongly centralised
in terms of policy direction, funding and
infrastructure investment. Local government
capacities and capabilities have been further
eroded by aggressive national requirements
for the outsourcing and privatisation of
urban utility provision, most recently by
post-2008 austerity cuts, leaving most critical
infrastructure systems in private and often
foreign ownership. Consequently, beyond
the larger cities of London, Manchester,
Birmingham, Bristol and Glasgow, there
was a weak recent track-record of local
authority-led smart city innovation.
The FCDC was therefore about stimulat-
ing new forms of public–private engagement,
and was designed to facilitate innovative
thinking. The agenda was deliberately broad
and flexible: ‘We are not specifying the chal-
lenges that should be tackled, the particular
systems that should be integrated, or the
approach that should be taken’ (TSB, 2012a:
3). However, the process exposes tensions
related to the FCDC’s aims and the context
for urban innovation in the UK. As indi-
cated above, asking local governments to
innovate was always likely to be a significant
challenge, particularly as the FCDC coin-
cided with significant post-2008 austerity
local government contraction. These cuts
were felt to particularly strongly affect the
capacity for thinking and innovation. As
one respondent pointed out:
this comes at a time when all thinkers [in the
local authority] are leaving. (Interview #8)
Knowledge and ideas originate from many
sources however (Hodson and Marvin,
2007), and the intention was for local
authorities to link to the private sector to
deliver their visions. Accordingly, many cit-
ies used the seed-corn money to commission
consultants such as Arup and WSP Group
to draft their bids, and indeed, Arup worked
on six of the final 29 bids – Bristol, Leeds,
Leicester, Manchester, Newcastle and
Sheffield. Most cities gleaned advice from a
variety of stakeholders. These included tech-
nology advice from technical consultancy
firms including: Siemens, IBM, Microsoft,
Intel, Cisco, Serco; and utility companies
such as: BT, Telefonica, Scottish Power,
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British Gas, E.On and various water
companies.
Overall, however, whether expertise was
commissioned or not, evidence suggests that
cities and their partners struggled to come up
with the innovation required. There was a
tendency for the same international exem-
plars to recur (Arup, 2013), such as
Hammarby Sjo¨stad in Sweden or the Vauban
district of Freiburg in Germany. The external
evaluation of feasibility studies suggests that
the lack of consultant diversity was a particu-
lar issue (Arup, 2013). Our interviews indi-
cate that most of the cities were using a
similar language, identifying the same prob-
lems and barriers, and gravitating towards
similar solutions and projects. Even the best
entries were felt to be limited in scope:
you didn’t get enough different ideas I don’t
think . I don’t think there was anything in
any of the other bids that struck us as mind-
blowingly innovative or different to be honest.
(Interview #7)
The competition structure also meant that
rather than city coalitions developing shared
ideas, each city was working individually,
developing numerous parallel approaches to
how integration between city systems might
be achieved, despite the obvious advantages
of collaborating on non-proprietary open
protocols and standards:
[the competition structure] probably restrained
or dampened collaboration between cities.
(Interview #5)
[one city said] ‘does anybody want to work
together on this?’. but no-one really followed
up on that, and I think everybody went into
competition mode. (Interview #10)
[the competition] made it very difficult for all
of the cities to have a meaningful conversation
. and that was very frustrating . that was
one of the key feedbacks that came from cities
– this doesn’t work. (Interview #7)
The city of Cambridge identified several
integration projects that were important for
the medium- to long-term aspirations of the
city, but which were excluded by the city
from the bid as they did not meet the TSB’s
eligibility criteria. For example, the Science
Park Railway Station information systems
that planned to extend the integration of
bus, rail, cycle and ticketing were said to be
‘superb integration examples’ but were not
due to go live until 2015 and were therefore
outside of the scope of the competition’s
2014 delivery deadline (Duff, 2012). It could
be argued that it is precisely this medium- to
long-term investment, which currently falls
outside the scope of common finance mod-
els, that ought to be encouraged through
government-sponsored innovation. The gov-
ernmental imperative to spend money within
fiscal timeframes often cuts across the need
for longer technical innovation timescales.
Another shortfall of the FCDC process was
that funds could not be used to bridge gaps
in existing project funding (Duff, 2012), even
where catalytic funding of this sort could
provide good value for public money. This
stipulation may be an example of the stated
goal of maximising impact being overridden
by the need to delineate direct FCDC
impacts in order to justify future govern-
ment funding. Overall, this meant that in
terms of innovation, the competition entries
were weak in terms of pushing forward sig-
nificantly on innovation or product
development.
Many cities identified significant internal
barriers to achieving their vision. Generally,
these were associated with a lack of appro-
priate skills, the need for behaviour change
within the authority, and limited opportuni-
ties to consult experts within the time avail-
able. Strong leadership was also seen as a
central requirement to drive a city vision,
coordinate between stakeholders and part-
ners, and challenge organisational silos. The
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most significant barrier identified by our
interviewees was the challenging timescale:
The machine that the TSB wanted to work
with wasn’t fit for the purpose that they had
. we just didn’t have the time to engage
internally. (Interview #8)
This meant that direct engagement with citi-
zens in the development of the bids was rare,
and wide stakeholder engagement was diffi-
cult. Such constraints are likely to have
inhibited creativity and the development of
the novel partnerships required to tackle the
complex and multi-sectoral problems posed
by city challenges.
It was also apparent that ongoing city
engagement and collaboration was not para-
mount for the TSB, which seemed unpre-
pared for the willingness of cities to continue
dialogue with each other after the FCDC
had finished:
The TSB are quite good at. running compe-
titions, but then actually learning from that
and [continuing] working relationships with
cities . I’m not sure how much capacity they
have. (Interview #1)
I don’t think they seemed that interested in
coming to talk to us . there wasn’t a lot of
depth to that feedback. (Interview #5)
Yet in some cases the competition did serve
to accelerate urban strategies by providing
extra resources and momentum to allow
them to evolve their thinking. In the city of
Sheffield, for example, the proposal to
install community-scale Wi-Fi alongside
smart meter installation stemmed from long-
standing attempts to drive local energy pol-
icy given the financial barriers to extending
its district heating system (Sheffield City
Council, 2012). In some respects, the pro-
posal was stronger on institutional innova-
tion around existing technologies than on
innovative smart city initiatives. In general,
the freedom to use £50,000 for exploratory
work was particularly important for local
authorities, and some pointed to the advan-
tages of being more equitable in the distribu-
tion of the FCDC prize fund to enable more
of this work.
The winning formula: Innovation and
implementation capacity
In January 2013, the city of Glasgow was
announced as the winner of the competition
and recipient of the £24m. Three of the
runner-up proposals were also given partial
funding to develop their proposals further,
and in April 2013, it was announced that
Peterborough, London and Bristol would
also receive grants of £3m each (Arup,
2013). So why was Glasgow successful?
Glasgow’s proposal was distinctive in its
ambition and its framing of intervention
around the city’s social and health priorities.
It centred on a smart city management sys-
tem, incorporating an intelligent operations
platform, a data repository, a series of city
dashboards and a citizen engagement app:
‘Glasgow will create a technology infrastruc-
ture to enable the integration of city systems
and data across multiple agencies for the
delivery of improved and responsive city ser-
vices [.] a structure easily replicated by
other urban areas’ (Glasgow City Council,
2012: 3). When compared with many of the
other proposals (see Table 3), it can be seen
that Glasgow’s proposal sat more comforta-
bly in the realms of the smart city imaginary.
In contrast, although Peterborough’s pro-
posed integration platform was in some
respects similar to Glasgow’s, it was under-
pinned by a slightly different ethos of priori-
tising community development by building
on its established Sustainable Community
Strategy, with stated priorities of regenerat-
ing neigbourhoods; empowering local com-
munities; and building community cohesion
(Peterborough City Council, 2012).
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Glasgow had the wider infrastructural
and institutional support needed to respond
to the FCDC’s ambition and co-authored its
bid with University of Strathclyde, IBI and
ACCESS Group (Glasgow City Council,
2012: 58). ACCESS LLP was established in
2008 with a 10-year, £265m contract to
transform the Council’s ICT and Property
Services. It is jointly owned by Serco Ltd
and Glasgow City Council. IBI Group is a
multidisciplinary built environment consul-
tant. Similarly, Bristol already had relevant
initiatives in place. It was an early signatory
of the Green Digital Charter, the only UK
city ever to have been shortlisted for the
European Green Capital Award, and
launched Smart City Bristol in 2011 (Bristol
City Council, 2012). London’s proposals
also built upon numerous existing initiatives,
including: a National Underground Asset
Group (NUAG) and Crossrail collabora-
tion; the EU funded CELCIUS Smart Cities
project; UK-leading activity by the GLA on
decentralised energy; the Low Carbon
London programme; the Mayor’s RE:NEW
programme; TSB’s Retrofit for the Future;
and the NHS Whole System Demonstrator
(Greater London Authority, 2012).
Significantly, Glasgow was also able to
leverage the FCDC funding with £500m of
Commonwealth Games investment. This
consisted of 20 major infrastructure and
venue projects, including a district heating
network, a new Games Route Network, and
Table 3. Content of the winning proposals.
Glasgow Bristol Peterborough London
Infrastructure
Wi-Fi X X
Sensors X X X X
Smart meter/grid X X X
2G/3G mobile network X
Physical space X X
GPS/satellite X
Heat network X X
Platforms
Web-based/virtual service Platform X X X X
Open data platform X X X X
Data platform X X
In-home device/interface X
System of application
Energy X X X
Water X X X
Transport X X X X
Community
Health & Social care X X X X
Safety & Security X
Local Economy X X X
Buildings X X
Education
Environment X X X
Housing
Waste X
Source: Arup (2013) and authors’ primary research.
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£40m of Fastlink bus rapid transit system
infrastructure, building on the city’s exten-
sive urban transport corridors.
Conclusions
Our aim in this paper has been to examine
the issues and challenges related to state
intervention in support of smart city innova-
tion. In particular, we have highlighted the
governmental and governance challenges in
turning the spatial imaginary of a technolo-
gically enhanced smart city into meaningful
urban projects, the politics of ‘filling-in’ the
smart city imaginary. Our starting point was
that local and national governments are
likely to have significant economic, social
and environmental interests in enabling
smart city restructuring, which in principle
ought to align with the burgeoning industry
of smart city businesses waiting for the
opportunity to transform urban infrastruc-
tures, if governments can create the right
market opportunities (cf. Viitanen and
Kingston, 2013).
However, the FCDC explored in the
empirical sections of this paper represents
some of the conflicts and difficulties for gov-
ernments in orchestrating smart city innova-
tion. These tensions stem partly from the
conflicting objectives of the FCDC and the
mismatch between national innovation pol-
icy and local political priorities. There were
certainly potential tensions between the
goals of delivering benefits to cities and
enhancing the UK’s capability in the lucra-
tive international smart city products and
services market. That the FCDC entries were
generally limited in scale and scope is per-
haps not surprising. Despite the pump-
priming resource, cities were expected to
innovate within short timescales in the con-
text of severe local authority budget cuts,
and the longer-term hollowing out of local
government power and influence.
Competing rationales in national policy were
perhaps reflected in a lack of clarity about
what bids should contain. Significantly,
under the competitive localism of UK
national innovation policy, cities were also
corralled into further inter-urban competi-
tion, rather than being encouraged to colla-
borate within a national cities framework.
Along with the lack of feedback and follow-
up, this indicates that the FCDC was less
concerned with improving the functioning of
UK cities and more interested in external
export opportunities. Developing innovative
smart city strategies was always likely to be
challenging, and it is difficult to avoid the
conclusion that municipal governments were
being asked to prospect for private-sector
investment on behalf of central government
but with limited generative power. There
was also limited awareness of local govern-
ment and private-sector capacity to respond
effectively, given the limited timescales and
resourcing of the initiative. The FCDC’s
technical bias also proved problematic.
Many commentators believe that urban
problems do not pivot on technical chal-
lenges (Gibbs et al., 2013), that solutions
must necessarily involve a proportion of
social innovation to succeed (e.g. Paquet,
2001), and that local scale is key so actors
can meet face to face, exchange tacit knowl-
edge and undertake collective action
(Karvonen and van Heur, 2014). In its
attempt to work through cities in the pursuit
of patentable and exportable products and
services, the TSB therefore started with a
poor understanding of the context for urban
governance and smart city innovation in the
UK. Arguably, this is why it was unsuccess-
ful in its remit to stimulate real technical
innovation and holistic systems integration.
In general, the FCDC parameters meant the
bids overestimated the transformative power
of technology and underestimated the
importance of the ‘soft’ human
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infrastructures that underpin urban
decision-making and governance.
Looking beyond the specific circum-
stances of the FCDC, the paper has rele-
vance to the broader and burgeoning
literature on smart city markets and initia-
tives. For instance, the FCDC’s curious set
up perhaps reflects wider difficulties in
mobilising around the ‘urban’ as a national
technical innovation sector, when in reality
the ‘urban’ is a human ecosystem comprising
protean relationships. The smart cities litera-
ture has focused strongly on the problems of
‘parachuting’ in urban consulting firms
offering solutions (Hodson et al., 2008;
Pincetl, 2010), but the FCDC reflected a dif-
ferent logic around empowering local gov-
ernment to orchestrate innovation. Whilst
local government was not necessarily
equipped for that task, our analysis points
to the difficulties in engaging innovative
private-sector firms. The most transforma-
tive ideas came from existing public–private
vehicles rather than new partnerships capa-
ble of rapid innovation, meaning the FCDC
was less about innovation and more about
maturity of personal public–private relation-
ships. In short, prospecting for private-
sector innovation through the FCDC proved
problematic. Short timescales, the need for
projects to start quickly, the limited capacity
of local government to forge appropriate
links and, crucially, the friction between
open source ‘city gains’ and closed source
intellectual property-based profits were all
factors that inhibited effective public–private
collaboration. This latter point is significant
given the differential capacity of cities to
finance projects and attract investment.
The scope of the bids is also a related but
critical issue. There is a crucial distinction
between ‘whole-city’ smart urban strategies
and the more focused project-based inter-
ventions typical of the bids (Luque et al.,
2014). Ultimately, the paper demonstrates
the translational difficulties in asking the
real smart city to ‘stand up’ (Hollands,
2008), at least as some type of transforma-
tive whole-city practical intervention. Some
of this is down to the mix of rationales and
logics within the UK national innovation
policy that sits behind the FCDC and also
the limited capacity of local government to
respond to the FCDC’s ambitious brief and
timescales. There was also a tension between
the aspiration for city systems to coalesce
and the realities of splintered service provi-
sion. Whether or not there is substance in
smart urbanism, the benefits are unlikely to
be identified through short-term responsive
bidding. A longer-term strategic perspective
is required to build relationships and iden-
tify meaningful synergies. In this respect, it
may be that the FCDC came too early in the
development phase of smart city technolo-
gies to generate meaningful applied research
and marketable solutions from the public or
private sector. Smart city restructuring may
be less about wholesale transformation and
more about the incremental enactment of
numerous initiatives and interventions by
governments, firms and citizens – a city
restructured through apps rather than oper-
ating systems (Desouza and Bhagwatwar,
2012). It remains to be seen whether the
open-ended experimentation required to
build infrastructural resilience is compatible
with neoliberalised and market-led
approaches to governance at the national
and urban scale.
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Note
1. The Greater London Authority (GLA) was
established by the GLA Act 1999 as a form
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of strategic citywide government for London.
It is made up of a directly elected Mayor and
a separately elected London Assembly. Its
responsibilities include budgetary, business
planning, ethical oversight, governance and
decision making functions.
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